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Abstract. The paper studies a cluster of systems for fully disquotational truth based on the restriction
of initial sequents. Unlike well-known alternative approaches, such systems display both a simple and
intuitive model theory and remarkable proof-theoretic properties. We start by showing that, due to a
strong form of invertibility of the truth rules, cut is eliminable in the systems via a standard strategy sup-
plemented by a suitable measure of the number of applications of truth rules to formulas in derivations.
Next, we notice that cut remains eliminable when suitable arithmetical axioms are added to the system.
Finally, we establish a direct link between cut-free derivability in innitary formulations of the systems
considered and xed-point semantics. Noticeably, unlike what happens with other background logics,
such links are established without imposing any restriction to the premisses of the truth rules.
1. Introduction
Due to the Liar paradox, fully disquotational approaches to truth – that is, satisfying the rules
(Trl) and (Trr) below – require a non-classical logical treatment. Among the nonclassical options,
a standard approach is to restrict operational rules for connectives that play a crucial role in the
derivation of the inconsistency, such as negation ormaterial implication. To this family of approaches
belong the various paracomplete or paraconsistent accounts of fully disquotational truth defended
in the literature (see e.g. [Fie08, Pri05, Kre88, Bea09, HH06]).
Formal systems for transparent truth based on restrictions of operational rules and featuring un-
restricted rules for semantic notions do not sit well with standard strategies to fully or partially elim-
inate applications of the cut rule.1 To explain why this is so, let us focus on the case of unrestricted
truth rules Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆ (Trl)Γ,Tr⌜휑⌝ ⇒ ∆ Γ ⇒ 휑,∆ (Trr)Γ ⇒ Tr⌜휑⌝,∆
In the rules, ⌜⋅⌝ is a quotation device that yields a canonical name for each sentence of the language.
When one wants to eliminate a cut on truth ascriptions Tr ⌜휑⌝ that are both obtained from (Tr -l)
and (Tr -r), a natural thought is to cut on the sentence 휑 in the premises of the application of these
rules. However it’s clear that Tr⌜휑⌝ is an atomic formula, whereas 휑may be an extremely (logically)
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1Actually, this generalizes to partial approaches to truth based on supervaluations. We shall elaborate on this point later.
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complex sentence. Therefore a simple induction on the logical complexity of the cut formula, on
which cut-elimination strategies are traditionally based, will not work. One has also to keep track of
the number of applications of truth rules and induct over it in the main induction hypothesis.
There are several alternatives for such tracking devices. One option is to assign a measure to
sequents, i.e. to nodes in the derivation tree. However, in the context of logics which restrict the
operational rules, this strategy can only be carried out if one restricts the truth rules, by disallowing
contexts in the premises. Once this restriction takes place, cut can be fully eliminated. Of course, the
price to pay is the adoption of properly weaker truth rules. This is for instance the strategy consid-
ered in [Can90, FG18] in the context of Strong Kleene logic and supervaluational logic respectively.
Alternatively, one can restrict the contraction rule, keep the node-based measure of applications of
semantic rules, and still obtain a full cut elimination proof [Gri82, Can03].2 However, the restriction
of contraction has its own drawbacks. For instance, whereas the systems based on the restriction of
operational rules are sound – and, in a suitably controlled environment, also complete – with respect
to a class of xed-point models [Kri75],3 no such link exists between contraction-free systems and
xed-point semantics or natural alternatives.
In this paper I consider a cluster of theories of transparent truth that display both a direct linkwith
xed-point semantics, but also desirable proof-theoretic properties culminating in the eliminability
of cut. Such systems are based on a restriction of initial sequents to formulas not containing the truth
predicate. The proof-theoretic arguments given below crucially rest on the adoption of a measure for
formulas in derivations, called Tr -complexity, that keeps track of the number of truth rules applied
to ancestors of a single formula in the given proof. While the notion of Tr -complexity is not new,4
it is its combination with the restriction of initial sequents in the context of transparent truth is the
main focus of the paper. Such connection has been studied already for a propositional logic extended
with rules for denitional reection in [SH16].5
Plan and structure of the paper. In section 2, I study the proof-theory of a ‘logic’ of truth LGT,
that is a system with no non-logical initial sequents and rules besides (Tr -l) and (Tr -r). The section
focuses on the denition of the main measure for application of truth rules called Tr -complexity
(Denition 2), the proof of the strong invertibility property of the main LGT-rules (Lemma 3), and
culminates with the eliminability of cut in LGT essentially achieved in Lemma 5. In the short section
3, we extend the results of section 2 to extensions of LGT with (geometric) arithmetical axioms by
employing the study of the proof-theory of geometric axioms from [NvP11]. This yields a uniform
conservativeness proof of local truth rules over the base theory (Proposition 1). Section 4 studies
2[Zar11] has also presented a cut-elimination argument for an (innitary) transparent theory of truth over a contraction-free
logic. However, both [RR18] and [Fje20] cast some doubts on the logical coherence and applicability of the proposal.
3More on xed point semantics in §4.
4Similar measures of complexity have been considered by [Hal99] and [Lei15].
5The key ideas of this paper were presented in Tübingen in 2017, where Peter Schröder-Heister pointed to his independent
work on the idea. The current shape of the paper and results beneted greatly from the study of Schröder-Heister’s work on
denitional reection.
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the connection of cut-free provability and an innitary extension of LGT with xed point seman-
tics (Lemmata 11 and 12). To achieved this, Tr -complexity is extended to the transnite, and cut
elimination is proved for an innitary extension of LGTℕ (Proposition 2).
As the reader will notice, the cut elimination strategy introduced in §2 feature prominently also
in the subsequent sections. Of course, an alternative way of presenting the paper would have been to
start with the arithmetical or the innitary setting, and then inferring the results of §2 as immediate
corollaries. The present structure of the paper is motivated by the intention of presenting the main
structural lemmata in a simple setting in §2, so that in the following sections the focus could be
mainly the required adjustments needed required by richer frameworks and on other properties such
as the connections with xed-point semantics.
2. Logics for transparent truth with restricted initial sequents
We start with a rst-order language ℒ with logical constants ¬,∧,∀, ⊥, ⊤. We let:ℒTr ∶= ℒ ∪ {Tr}, for Tr a unary predicate symbol.
We write AtFmlℒTr for the set of atomic formulas ofℒTr , and SentℒTr for the set of sentences ofℒTr .
It is useful not to regard ⊤,⊥ as members of AtFmlℒTr . The logical complexity |휑| of a formula 휑 ofℒTr is dened inductively as the number of nodes in the maximal branch of its syntactic tree:
|휑| = ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0, if 휑 is atomic or ⊥,⊤,|휓| + 1, if 휑 ≡ ¬휓 or 휑 ≡ ∀푥휓,max(|휓|, |휒|) + 1, if 휑 ≡ 휓 ∧ 휒.
To properly formulate our truth rules in the simple setting studied in this section, we follow the
standard practice of assuming that for any sentence 휑 ∈ ℒTr , there is a term ⌜휑⌝ playing the logical
role of its name [Kre88, Can03, Rip12]. In general, there are good reasons to requiremuchmore than
a simple, essentially metatheoretic quotation device and work with a fully edged formal syntax in
the background. We will see later on that much of our discussion can be transferred to such richer
settings.
In what follows, Γ,∆,Θ,Λ… stand for nite multisets of formulas of ℒTr – and the same notation
will be employed for the dierent languages considered below. Expressions of the form Γ ⇒ ∆ are
sequents. We assume a standard notion of substitution and write Γ(푡∕푥) for the result of replacing all
free occurrences of 푥 in all formulas in Γ with the term 푡, which is assumed to be free for 푥 in such
formulas. For a formula 휑, we denote with FV(휑) the set of its free variables. FV(Γ) denotes the set
of free variables in formulas in Γ.
The system LGT is essentially characterized by all operational rules of classical logic, fully disquo-
tational truth rules, and crucially by a restriction of initial sequents to principal formulas that are
atomic and do not contain Tr . In the terminology of [TS03], LGT is an extension of a퐆ퟑ system. The
label LGT stands for ‘logic of grounded truth’. This choice is informallymotivated by the fact that one
can read the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ in LGT as stating that either some member of Γ is determinately false,
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or some member of ∆ is determinately true. This informal picture will be rened by the semantic
considerations of Section 4 – and Lemma 11 in particular.
Definition 1 (LGT). The system LGT in ℒTr features the following initial sequents and rules:6
(ref−) Γ, 휑 ⇒ 휑,∆
with 휑 ∈ AtFmlℒ Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑 휑,Γ ⇒ ∆(cut) Γ ⇒ ∆
(⊤) Γ ⇒ ⊤,∆ (⊥) Γ, ⊥ ⇒ ∆Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆(Trl) Γ,Tr⌜휑⌝ ⇒ ∆ Γ ⇒ 휑,∆(Trr) Γ ⇒ Tr⌜휑⌝,∆Γ ⇒ 휑,∆(¬l) Γ,¬휑 ⇒ ∆ Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆(¬r) Γ ⇒ ¬휑,∆Γ, 휑, 휓 ⇒ ∆(∧l) Γ, 휑 ∧ 휓 ⇒ ∆ Γ ⇒ 휑,∆ Γ ⇒ 휓,∆(∧r) Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑 ∧ 휓Γ,∀푥휑, 휑(푠∕푥) ⇒ ∆
(∀l) Γ,∀푥휑 ⇒ ∆ Γ ⇒ 휑(푦∕푥),∆(∀r) 푦 ∉ FV(Γ,∆,∀푥휑)Γ ⇒ ∆,∀푥휑
The followingmeasures of complexity are also standard. We employ the usual notions of premisses
and conclusion of rules, principal, active, side formulas [Sch77, TS03]:
(i) Given rules that are at most 훼-branching, the length 푑 of a derivation풟 issup{푑훾 + 1 | 훾 < 훽}
where풟훾 (훾 < 훽 ≤ 훼) are풟’s direct subderivations.
(ii) The rank of an application of cut on 휑 is |휑| + 1. The cut rank of a derivation 풟 is the
maximum of the ranks of cut formulas in풟.
It will sometimes be useful to refer directly to dierent occurrences of the same (qua syntactic
object) formula in a derivation (cf. [SH16]). When writing, say,
(1) 훾푗11 ,… , 훾푗푛푛 ⇒ 훿푘11 ,… , 훿푘푚푚 , 휑훾푗1+11 ,… , 훾푗푛+1푛 ⇒ 훿푘1+11 ,… , 훿푘푚+1푚 , 휓
we assume that occurrences of 훾푗푖 , with 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛 correspond precisely to occurrences of 훾푗+1푖 –
i.e. they are distinct occurrences of the same formula – and similarly for the 훿’s. As an abbreviation,
this will be generalized to multisets of sentences: I occasionally write Γ푗 instead of 훾푗11 ,… , 훾푗푛푛 . It
should be clear that superscripts are not part of the language.
The idea behind the following measure on proofs, that we call Tr -complexity, plays an important
role in recent proof-theoretic studies of primitive truth predicates [Hal99, Lei15]. It essentially tracks
6We omitted the standard퐆ퟑ-rules for∨,∃, which are nonetheless admissible in the systems below by employing the standard
denitions of ∨ and ∃ in terms of ∧,¬,∀.
Cut and Initial Sequents 5
the number of truth rules applied to formulas in derivations. If contraction present, such measure is
not easy to dene and employ.7 We will see that the restriction of initial sequents and the absence of
explicit contraction enable us to apply the notion of Tr -complexity in the general case of type-free,
disquotational truth.
Definition 2 (Tr -complexity). The ordinal Tr -complexity of a formula 휑 ofℒTr in a derivation풟 inLGT – in symbols, 휏풟(휑) is dened inductively as follows:
(i) 휏풟(휑) = 0 if 휑 ∈ ℒ;
(ii) If풟 contains only an initial sequent node (ref,⊤,⊥), then 휏풟(휑) = 0 for all formulas in it.
(iii) If풟 ends with Γ ⇒ ∆, 휓Γ ⇒ ∆,Tr⌜휓⌝
then 휏풟(Tr ⌜휓⌝) = 휏풟(휓) + 1 and the Tr -complexity of the formulas in Γ,∆ is unchanged.
Similarly for (Trl).
(iv) If풟 ends with Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑¬휑,Γ ⇒ ∆
then 휏풟(휑) = 휏풟(¬휑) and the Tr -complexity of the formulas in Γ,∆ is unchanged. Similarly
for (¬r) and (∀r).
(v) If풟 ends with Γ, 휑, 휓 ⇒ ∆휑 ∧ 휓,Γ ⇒ ∆
then 휏풟(휑 ∧ 휓) = max(휏풟(휑), 휏풟(휓)) and the Tr -complexity of the formulas in Γ,∆ is un-
changed.
(vi) If풟 ends with (cf. notational convention after (1)),Γ푗 ⇒ 휑,∆푘 Γ푙 ⇒ 휓,∆푝Γ ⇒ 휑 ∧ 휓,∆
then 휏풟(휑 ∧ 휓) = max(휏풟(휑), 휏풟(휓)), and휏풟(훾푖) = max(휏풟(훾푗푖푖 ), 휏풟(훾푙푖푖 )), 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛;휏풟(훿푖) = max(휏풟(훿푘푖푖 ), 휏풟(훿푝푖푖 )), 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푚.
(vii) If풟 ends with Γ,∀푥휑푘, 휑(푡) ⇒ ∆∀푥휑푙,Γ ⇒ ∆
then 휏풟(∀푥휑푙) = max(휏풟(∀푥휑푘), 휏풟(휑(푡))) and the Tr -complexity of the formulas in Γ,∆ is
unchanged.
(viii) In an application of (cut), the Tr -complexity of the formulas in the conclusion of the rule is
treated as in case (vi) above.
7It is in fact the presence of contraction that led to error in its applications in [Hal99], which are rectied by [Lei15], but only
for typed truth, not type-free truth.
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Finally, the 휏-complexity of an LGT-proof풟 is the maximum of the Tr -complexities for the formulas
occurring in it.
In what follows, it will be convenient to keep track of all derivation measure in a more compact
notation.
Notation. We write:
- LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆ for ‘the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ has a proof in LGT with length ≤ 푛, cut-rank ≤ 푚,
and Tr -complexity ≤ 푘’.
- LGT 푛 Γ ⇒ ∆ for ‘there are푚, 푘 such that LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆’, and LGT Γ ⇒ ∆ for ‘there is푛 such that LGT 푛 Γ ⇒ ∆’.
- We will omit, when it’s clear from the context, reference to the background system and write푚,푘푛 instead of LGT 푚,푘푛 .
- Wewill occasionally also need to refer to the truth complexity of a single formula in a sequent
as well. We will keep reference to the proof implicit, and write 푘휑 for ‘the occurrence of 휑
has truth complexity 푘 in the given derivation’.
The next lemma states the monotonicity of some of our measures (length and Tr -complexity),
some basic properties of⊥ and⊤ in derivations, and the fully structural nature ofLGTwhen formulas
of the base language are at stake. Their proof follows almost immediately from the denition ofLGT 푚,푘푛 (monotonicity), or by straightforward inductions on the length of the proof in LGT.
Lemma 1.
(i) If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, and 푘 ≤ 푘0 and 푛 ≤ 푛0, then LGT 푚,푘0푛0 Γ ⇒ ∆.
(ii) If LGT 푚,푘푛 ⊤,Γ ⇒ ∆, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆ and the Tr -complexity of the formulas in the
contexts is unchanged.
(iii) If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, ⊥, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆ and the Tr -complexity of the formulas in the
contexts is unchanged.
(iv) LGT Γ, 휑 ⇒ 휑,∆ for all 휑 ∈ ℒ.
The usual substitution and weakening lemmata hold for LGT. Crucially for our purposes, they
do not entail any increase in the Tr -complexity of the derivation. In the case of weakening, this
essentially relies on the fact that, by Denition 2(ii), side formulas in initial sequents have minimalTr -complexity.
Lemma 2 (Substitution, Weakening).
(i) If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ(푡∕푥) ⇒ ∆(푡∕푥), where 푡 does not contain variables
employed in applications of (∀r) in the proof of Γ ⇒ ∆. The Tr -complexity of all formulas inΓ,∆ is unchanged by the substitution.
(ii) If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ,Θ ⇒ ∆,Λ. Moreover, the Tr -complexity of each formula
in Γ,∆ is unchanged.
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The next lemma contains the key property that dierentiates LGT from other nonclassical and
substructural approaches (cf remark 1 below). Crucially, it states that truth rules are invertible in a
way that does not increase neither the length nor the Tr -complexity of the derivation. In particular,
when truth ascriptions have non-zero Tr -complexity, inversion actually reduces their truth complex-
ity. This property is essential for establishing the admissibility of contraction in LGT and therefore
cut-elimination.
Lemma 3 (Invertibility of LGT-rules).
(i) If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ,Tr⌜휑⌝ ⇒ ∆, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆, with휏(휑) ≤ 휏(Tr⌜휑⌝), if 휏(Tr⌜휑⌝) = 0,휏(휑) < 휏(Tr⌜휑⌝), if 휏(Tr⌜휑⌝) > 0,
and in which the Tr -complexity in the side formulas does not increase.
A symmetric claim holds when LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ Tr⌜휑⌝,∆.
(ii) If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ,¬휑 ⇒ ∆, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ 휑,∆ with 휏(휑) ≤ 휏(¬휑) and in which the 휏-
complexity of the side formulas does not increase.
A symmetric claim holds when LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒,¬휑,∆.
(iii) If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ, 휑 ∧휓 ⇒ ∆, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ, 휑, 휓 ⇒ ∆ with 휏(휑), 휏(휓) ≤ 휏(휑 ∧휓) and in which
the 휏-complexity of the side formulas does not increase.
(iv) If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ 휑 ∧ 휓,∆, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑 and LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, 휓 with 휏(휑), 휏(휓) ≤휏(휑 ∧ 휓) and in which the complexity of the side formulas is no greater than their 휏-maximal
occurrence in the premisses.
(v) If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆,∀푥휑, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑(푦), for any 푦 not free in Γ,∆,∀푥휑, with휏(휑(푦)) ≤ 휏(∀푥휑) and in which the complexity of the side formulas does not increase.
Proof. We show (i) by induction on 푛. The other cases are easier.
If 0 Γ,Tr ⌜휑⌝ ⇒ ∆ – i.e. Γ,Tr ⌜휑⌝ ⇒ ∆ is an axiom –, then 휏(Tr ⌜휑⌝) = 0. Therefore, also0 Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆ and 휏(휑) ≤ 휏(Tr⌜휑⌝).
If 푚,푘푛 Γ,Tr⌜휑⌝ ⇒ ∆ with 푛 > 0, then Tr⌜휑⌝might be principal or not in the last inference. If it’s
principal, we haveLGT 푚,푘0푛0 Γ, 푝0휑 ⇒ ∆ 푛0 < 푛, 푝0 < 푘, 푘0 ≤ 푘.
(recall that 푝0휑 signies 휏(휑) = 푝0). The claim is then obtained by monotonicity (lemma 1(i)).
IfTr⌜휑⌝ is not principal, let’s suppose – to consider one of the crucial cases – that the last inference
is an application of (Trr). We then have:
푚0,푘0푛0 Γ, 푝0Tr⌜휑⌝ ⇒ ∆0, 푝1휓, ∆ = ∆0,Tr⌜휓⌝, 푛0 < 푛,푚0 = 푚, 푘0 ≤ 푘, 푝0 ≤ 푘, 푝1 < 푘.
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By the induction hypothesis, 푚0,푘0푛0 Γ, 푝2휑 ⇒ ∆0, 푝1휓, with 푝2 ≤ 푝0, and therefore, by (Trr),
푚,푘푛 Γ, 푝2휑 ⇒ ∆0, 푝3Tr⌜휓⌝ 푝3 ≤ 푘.
The remaining cases for this subcase are similarly obtained by induction hypothesis.
qed.
remark 1. It is important to observe that, in the presence of initial sequents admitting arbitrary
atomic formulas of ℒTr , the inversion strategy considered above will not go through. For instance,
the derivability of a sequent of the form Γ,Tr ⌜휑⌝ ⇒ Tr ⌜휑⌝,∆ does not guarantee, for instance, the
derivability of a sequent Γ,Tr⌜휑⌝ ⇒ 휑,∆ with 휏(휑) ≤ 휏(Tr⌜휑⌝).
The absence of explicit contraction – either as a rule or by the assumption of nite sets in sequents
– is especially welcome when reasoning with measures such as the Tr -complexity, because it may
prove to be dicult to track theTr -complexity of each formula in a derivation if it is explicitly allowed
to merge with the Tr -complexity other occurrences of the same formula in proofs. However, as it is
shown in the next lemma, contraction is an admissible rule in LGT.
Lemma 4 (휏-admissibility of contraction).
(i) If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ, 휑푝0 , 휑푝1 ⇒ ∆, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆ with 휏(휑) ≤ max(휏(휑푝0), 휏(휑푝1)) and in
which the complexity of the side formulas does not increase.
(ii) If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ 휑푝0 , 휑푝1 ,∆, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ 휑,∆ with 휏(휑) ≤ max(휏(휑푝0), 휏(휑푝1)) and in
which the complexity of the side formulas does not increase.
Proof. (i) and (ii) are proved simultaneously by induction on 푛. Let us focus on (i).
If 0 Γ, 휑푝0 , 휑푝1 ⇒ ∆, then in each case 휏(휑푝0) = 휏(휑푝1) = 0 and we have 0 Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆ in which
all formulas have Tr -complexity 0. If 푙+1 Γ, 휑푝0 , 휑푝1 ⇒ ∆ and neither 휑푝0 nor 휑푝1 are principal in
the last inference, then 푙+1 Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆ – with the expected Tr -complexities – by induction hypothesis
and possibly monotonicity.
It remains the case in which 푙+1 Γ, 휑푝0 , 휑푝1 ⇒ ∆ or Γ ⇒ 휑푝0 , 휑푝1 ,∆ and one of 휑푝0 or 휑푝1 is
principal in the last inference. As an example, I treat the crucial case in which 휑 is Tr ⌜휓⌝. By
assumption, 푙 Γ, 휓푝00 ,Tr⌜휓⌝푝1 ⇒ ∆
with 휏(휓푝00) < 휏(Tr⌜휓⌝푝0) ≤ 푘.8 By inversion, we have that푙 Γ, 휓푝00 , 휓푝10 ⇒ ∆.
It can then be that 휏(휓푝10) = 휏(Tr⌜휓⌝푝1) = 0, or 휏(휓푝10) < 휏(Tr⌜휓⌝푝1). In both cases, we obtain푙+1 Γ,Tr⌜휓⌝ ⇒ ∆
8Of course, strictly speaking, inversion may not provide a copy of the proof in which the structure of the occurrences given by
the superscripts is preserved. However, since the only relevant detail here is to distinguish between the two occurrences ‘to
be contracted’, we keep the same index for the same formulas before and after the application of inversion.
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with 휏(Tr ⌜휓⌝) ≤ max(휏(Tr ⌜휓⌝푝0), 휏(Tr ⌜휓⌝푝1)). It is crucial to observe that without the strong
invertibility property expressed by lemma 3(i) – which in turn relies on the restriction of initial se-
quents –, one would not be able to establish this case. In particular, if 휏(Tr⌜휓⌝푝1) = 푘 > 휏(Tr⌜휓⌝푝0),
without the special invertibility property of Lemma 3(i) one would not be able to complete the proof.
It is also worth noticing that the formulation of (∀l) and its associated Tr -complexity renders the
case of (i) inwhich one of the휑’s is principal in the last inference and of the form∀푥휑 straightforward.
Also, the simultaneous induction is especially required in the case in which the last inference is an
application of (¬l) to 휑푝0 or 휑푝1 – and symmetrically for (ii) and (¬r).
qed.
The reduction lemma can now be proved in a fairly standard way. We let (훼1,… , 훼푚) ≺ (훽1,… , 훽푛)
if 훼푖 < 훽푖 (푖 = 1,… , 푛), and for all 푗 < 푖, 훼푗 = 훽푗 .
Lemma 5 (Reduction). If LGT 푚,푘푛0 Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑푙0 and LGT 푚,푘푛1 휑푙1 ,Γ ⇒ ∆, then LGT 푚,푘푛0+푛1 Γ ⇒ ∆.
Proof. The proof is bymultiple, complete induction on (푘, 푙,푚, 푛0+푛1), with 푙 = max(휏(휑푙0), 휏(휑푙0)).
Our induction hypothesis is thus:
(2) 푚′,푘′푛′0 Γ ⇒ ∆, 휓 and LGT 푚′,푘′푛′1 휓,Γ ⇒ ∆ entail 푚′,푘′푛′0+푛′1 Γ ⇒ ∆,
for |휓| ≤ 푚 and (푘′, 푙′, 푚′, 푛′0 + 푛′1) ≺ (푘, 푙,푚, 푛0 + 푛1). We only focus on cases in which the Tr -
complexity plays a crucial role. The rest is standard.
If one of Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑푙0 or Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑푙1 is an axiom, one has to distinguish dierent subcases: If 휑푙0 or휑푙1 are principal, then depending on whether 휑 is ⊥, ⊤, or atomic, we employ Lemma 1(i) (in the
former cases), or Lemma 4(i). The Tr -complexity of the derivation is then always ≤ 푘, as required.
If neither of 휑푙0 and 휑푙1 is principal, then Γ ⇒ ∆ is already an axiom with minimal Tr -complexity.
Suppose now that none of Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑푙0 or 휑푙1 ,Γ ⇒ ∆ are axioms, but 휑 is not principal in the last
inference of one of their derivations, for instance the derivation of Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑푙0 . In such cases, the
strategy is analogous for all rules. Let’s consider the case of (Trl) as an example; that is, the case in
which one has
푚,푘푛0 Γ0, 푝Tr⌜휓⌝ ⇒ ∆, 휑 푚,푘푛1 휑,Γ0,Tr⌜휓⌝ ⇒ ∆
and the leftmost claim is obtained by (Trl) from
푚,푘0푛00 Γ0, 푝0휓 ⇒ ∆, 휑
with 푝 = 푝0 + 1 ≤ 푘, 푛00 < 푛0 and 푘0 ≤ 푘, and Γ ≡ Γ0,Tr ⌜휓⌝. By the weakening lemma, we then
obtain
푚,푘0푛00 Γ0, 0Tr⌜휓⌝, 휓 ⇒ ∆, 휑 푚,푘푛1 휑,Γ0, 푝1Tr⌜휓⌝, 0휓 ⇒ ∆
with 푝1 ≤ 푘. Since 푛00 + 푛1 < 푛0 + 푛1, the induction hypothesis yields:
푚,푘푛00+푛1 Γ0, 푝1Tr⌜휓⌝, 푝0휓 ⇒ ∆.
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By applying (Trl) and lemma 4, one obtains that
푚,푘푛00+1+푛1 Γ0,Tr⌜휓⌝ ⇒ ∆.
This, however, yields the desired claim since 푛00 + 1 + 푛1 ≤ 푛0 + 푛1 and 휏(Tr⌜휓⌝) = max(푝, 푝1).
We are left with the case in which both 휑푙0 and 휑푙1 are principal in the last inferences of the rel-
evant derivations. The case in which 휑 ≡ Tr ⌜휓⌝ follows directly by the induction hypothesis: if휏(Tr⌜휓⌝푙0) = 휏(Tr⌜휓⌝푙1) = 푘, this follows by themain inductionhypothesis; if 휏(Tr⌜휓⌝푙0), 휏(Tr⌜휓⌝푙1) <푘, by the secondary induction hypothesis, since we have 휏(휓푙푖0) < 휏(Tr⌜휓⌝푙푖 ), with 푖 = 0, 1.
It is worth noting that the case in which 휑 ≡ ∀푥휓 is treated standardly as well but one has rst to
get rid of the universal quantier in the premise of (∀l). This involves an essential application of the
substitution lemma that, as we know, leaves Tr -complexities unchanged. qed.
As is it clear from the Reduction Lemma, we obtain a cut-elimination theorem with standard
hyper-exponential upper bounds.
Corollary 1. If LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, then LGT 0,푘2푛푚 Γ ⇒ ∆.
Cut-elimination obviously entails the consistency of LGT, dened for instance as the underivabil-
ity of the empty sequent in LGT. This may be considered to be a nice feature of LGT qua theory of
disquotational truth, as its consistency does not require more substantial notions of mathematical
truth such as the ones involved in model-theoretic consistency proofs. However, often the presence
of nice models – even if interpreted in a purely instrumental way – is a sign of the presence of a nice
heuristics for one’s truth predicate. We will see (section 3) that LGT also features nice models.
3. Extension with arithmetical axioms
The cut elimination above can be easily extended to induction-free, arithmetical base theories. For
deniteness, we choose our base arithmetical theory to be Robinson’s Q. However, what is relevant
for our discussion is the geometric nature of such arithmetical axioms. We adapt to out setting the
approach to the proof-theory of geometric rules investigated by [NvP11]. Since the main structural
lemmata have been introduced, this mainly involves checking that Negri and Von Plato’s extension
with geometric axioms interacts well with the truth rules and in particular with the notion of Tr -
complexity and its properties.
In this section we work with the language ℒℕ of arithmetic. For deniteness, we assume the
language of arithmetic is specied by the signature {0, S,+,×} and letℒTrℕ ∶= ℒℕ ∪ {Tr}. We assume
a standard Gödel numbering of ℒTr and write #푒 for the Gödel number of the ℒTr -expression 푒 and⌜푒⌝ for the corresponding numeral. Numerals are dened as: 0 ∶= 0 and 푛 + 1 = S푛.
The axioms of Robinson’s arithmetic Q are the universal closures of the following ℒℕ-formulas:¬0 = S(푥), S(푥) = S(푦)→ 푥 = 푦,푥 = 0 ∨ ∃푦(푥 = S(푦)), 푥 + 0 = 푥,푥 + S(푦) = S(푥 + 푦), 푥 × 0 = 0,푥 × S(푦) = (푥 × 푦) + 푥.
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As shown in [NvP11], a G3-version of Q – equivalent to the axiom based system given above –
can be dened. In the present context, it will play the role of the base theory of our theory of truth,
in that it provides us with some explicit machinery for naming sentences of our language. Unlike
what is done in the previous section, we will simultaneously dene derivations in our base system
and the relevant measures by means of the relation Qg 푚,푘푛 . We will include a parameter for theTr -complexity in this denition to allow for straightforward extensions, although of course if one
focuses on purely arithmetical derivations the Tr -complexity of the proof is always 0.
Definition 3 (Qg). Qg extends the logic of LGT formulated inℒTr – together with a restriction of (ref)
to atomic formulas of ℒℕ and by omitting (⊥) and (⊤) – with the following rules(= 1) If Qg 푚,푘푛0 Γ, 푡 = 푡 ⇒ ∆, then Qg 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, with 푛0 ≤ 푛.(= 2) If Qg 푚,푘푛0 푠 = 푡, 휑(푠), 휑(푡),Γ ⇒ ∆, then 푚,푘푛 푠 = 푡, 휑(푡),Γ ⇒ ∆, with 휑(푣) an atomic formula
of ℒℕ and 푛0 < 푛.(Qg1) Qg 푚,푘푛 Γ, S푥 = 0 ⇒ ∆ for any 푛,푚, 푘.(Qg2) If Qg 푚,푘푛0 Γ, 푥 = 푦, S(푥) = S(푦) ⇒ ∆, then Qg 푚,푘푛 Γ, S(푥) = S(푦) ⇒ ∆, with 푛0 < 푛.(Qg3) If Qg 푚,푘푛0 Γ, 푥 = 0 ⇒ ∆ and Qg 푚,푘푛1 Γ, 푦 = S(푥) ⇒ ∆, then Qg 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, with 푛0, 푛1 < 푛
and with 푦 ∉ FV(Γ,∆, 푥 = 0).(Qg4) If Qg 푚,푘푛0 Γ, 푥 + 0 = 푥 ⇒ ∆, then Qg 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, with 푛0 < 푛.(Qg5) If Qg 푚,푘푛0 Γ, 푥 + S(푦) = S(푥 + 푦) ⇒ ∆, then Qg 푚,푘푛0 Γ ⇒ ∆, with 푛0 < 푛.(Qg6) If Qg 푚,푘푛0 Γ, 푥 × 0 = 0 ⇒ ∆, then Qg 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, with 푛0 < 푛.(Qg7) If Qg 푚,푘푛0 Γ, 푥 × S(푦) = (푥 × 푦) + 푥 ⇒ ∆, then Qg 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, with 푛0 < 푛.
In (Qg3), 푦 acts as an eigenvariable, because is is intended to be playing the role of an existentially
quantiable variable.
As before, by a straightforward induction on the length of the proof inQg, we can show that, as far
as formulas of ℒℕ are concerned, reexivity holds for them. The next lemma states that, as desired,Qg and Q prove the same theorems.
Lemma 6. Q ⊢⋀Γ→⋁∆ if and only if Qg ⊢ Γ ⇒ ∆.
The system LGTℕ is obtained by extendingQg with fully disquotational truth. The truth rules are
only notational variations of (Trl) and (Trr).
Definition 4. The relation LGTℕ 푚,푘푛 is dened by means of the direct analogues of clauses (= 1)-(Qg7) from Denition 3 plus:(Trrℕ) If LGTℕ 푚,푘0푛0 Γ ⇒ 휑,∆, then LGTℕ 푚,푘0푛 Γ ⇒ Tr 푙,∆, with 푛0 < 푛, 푘0 ≤ 푘, 푙 = #휑,휏(Tr 푙) = 휏(휑) + 1, and the Tr -complexities of the side formulas are unchanged.
Cut and Initial Sequents 12(Trlℕ) If LGTℕ 푚,푘0푛0 Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆, then LGTℕ 푚,푘0푛 Γ,Tr 푙 ⇒ ∆, with 푛0 < 푛, 푘0 ≤ 푘, 푙 = #휑,휏(Tr 푙) = 휏(휑) + 1, and the Tr -complexities of the side formulas are unchanged.
remark 2. In the rest of the section, we assume that so-called pure variable convention. That is,
free and bound variables are always distinct in proofs, and that the eigenvariables of applications of(Qg3) in proofs are distinct.
As before, the identity axioms hold unrestrictedly for sentences of ℒℕ, so we have
(3) LGTℕ ⊢ Γ, 휑 ⇒ 휑,∆ for all 휑 ∈ ℒℕ.
The substitution lemma for LGTℕ – compared with its analogue in the previous section – needs
a little extra care in dealing with the variables of the geometric rules. Essentially, in the required
induction on the length of the proof in LGTℕ, the cases of (∀r) and (Qg3) require the eigenvariables
not to occur in the substituens. Similarly, in the weakening lemma one only needs to be careful that
the weakened formulas do not contain variables that may appear in geometric rules. In such cases
the substitution lemma can be employed. Tr -complexities are handled in precisely the same way as
before.
Lemma 7 (Substitution, Weakening).
(i) If LGTℕ 푚,푘푛 , then LGTℕ 푚,푘푛 Γ(푡∕푥) ⇒ ∆(푡∕푥) where 푡 is free for 푥 in Γ,∆ and it does not
contain any eigenvariables employed in applications of (∀r), as well as variables employedQg-
rules. The substitution does not change the Tr -complexity of the formulas occurring in Γ,∆.
(ii) If LGTℕ 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, then LGTℕ 푚,푘푛 Γ,Θ ⇒ ∆,Λ. Moreover, the Tr -complexity of each
formula in Γ,∆ is unchanged.
The invertibility lemma also proceeds with minor variations. Crucially, the kind of 휏-invertibility
for the truth rules involved in lemma 3(i) is preserved. To prove an analogue of Lemma 3(v), one
employs Remark 2 to ensure that if the last inference involves a geometric rule such as (Qg3), the
role of the eigenvariable in the geometric rule is preserved.
Lemma 8 (Inversion). The propositional logical rules of LGTℕ are 휏-invertible in the way described by
Lemma 3(ii)-(iv). Moreover:
(i) If LGTℕ 푚,푘푛 Γ,Tr 푙 ⇒ ∆ with 푙 = #휑, then LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆, with휏(휑) ≤ 휏(Tr 푙), if 휏(Tr⌜휑⌝) = 0,휏(휑) < 휏(Tr 푙), if 휏(Tr⌜휑⌝) > 0,
and with unchanged Tr -complexity in the side formulas.
A symmetric claim holds when LGT 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ Tr⌜휑⌝,∆.
(ii) If LGTℕ 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆,∀푥휑, then LGTℕ 푚,푘푛 Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑(푦), for any 푦 not free in Γ,∆,∀푥휑 and not
among the variables of geometric rules, with 휏(휑(푦)) ≤ 휏(∀푥휑) and in which the complexity of
the side formulas does not increase.
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The previous lemmata makes it possible to extend in a straightforward way the 휏-admissibility of
contraction to LGTℕ.
Lemma 9. IfLGTℕ 푚,푘푛 Γ, 휑푘0 , 휑푘1 ⇒ ∆, thenLGTℕ 푚,푘푛 Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆withwith 휏(휑) ≤ max(휏(휑푘0), 휏(휑푘1))
and in which the complexity of the side formulas does not increase. A symmetric claim holds for when
the formulas to be contracted appear on the consequent.
With these lemmata at hand, we are then able prove a reduction lemma in the same vein as the
previous section. Noticeably, the interaction between truth, identity, and arithmetical rules is par-
ticularly smooth because truth rules only apply to closed terms naming sentences, and therefore no
extra-care with variables is needed to deal with cases in which the elimination of a cut on a non-
principal truth ascription is performed by performing the cut on the premisses of a geometric rule.
The cut-elimination procedure in the presence of geometric rules does not change the hyperexpo-
nential upper-bound.
Corollary 2. Cut is eliminable in LGTℕ.
The method outlined in this section straightforwardly extends to geometric rules corresponding
to the dening equations of other primitive recursive functions. One could also then strengthen the
truth rules, for instance, to pointwise compositional rules such as:Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑 Γ ⇒ ∆, 휓Γ ⇒ ∆,Tr(푙∧.푚)
with #휑 = 푙,#휓 = 푚 and ∧. the function symbol representing in ℒℕ the syntactic operation#휑,#휓 ↦ #(휑 ∧ 휓).
Finally, Corollary 2 and subsequent remarks clearly yields conservativity properties of the rules
(Trl) and (Trr) over base theories given by geometric axioms. In fact, for 휑 ∈ ℒℕ, if LGTℕ ⊢⇒ 휑,
then there is a cut-free proof풟 of⇒ 휑. All succedents in풟must be subformulas of휑, and all formulas
in the antecedents must be formulas of ℒℕ, because they are the only ones that may disappear due
to geometric and identity rules. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 1. LGTℕ is a conservative extension of Qg.
4. Infinitary rules and semantics
In this section we rst extend LGT and associated proof-theoretic to an innitary system LGT∞,
and then establish the anticipated links between LGT∞ and xed-point semantics.
4.1. Innitary rules. It is convenient to work with an expansion of ℒℕ with funtion symbols for
primitive recursive functions, which we call ℒ+ℕ. We then in turn denote with ℒ+Tr the expansion
of ℒ+ℕ with the predicate Tr . ℒ+ℕ will then contain function symbols corresponding to syntactic
operations on Gödel numbers such as ∧. above and푛 ↦ #(Tr푛), 푛,푚 ↦ #(Tr⌜… ⌜Tr⏟⎴⏟⎴⏟푛 Tr s 푛⌝…⌝)(4)
Cut and Initial Sequents 14푛 ↦ #푛 #휑(푣),#푡 ↦ #(휑(푡∕푣))#휑 ↦ #(¬휑) #휑,#푣 ↦ #(∀푣휑) #푠,#푡 ↦ #(푠 = 푡)
Wewill employ, respectively, the function symbols 푇. , tr,num, sub,¬. ,∀. ,=. to express those operations
in our language. On occasion we will make reference to a function symbol val for a recursive evalu-
ation function for primitive recursive functions.
The innitary system LGT∞ is essentially obtained by reformulating LGT in ℒ+Tr , replacing basic
truth and falsities with arithmetical truths and falsities, and supplementing the system with an 휔-
rule. Later on we will also consider the language ℒ2ℕ of second-order arithmetic, extending ℒ+ℕ with
second-order (relational) variables and quantiers. The presence of the omega-rule makes the length
of derivation, as well as the associatedTr -complexities, possibly innite –more precisely, a countable
ordinal. In particular, the denition of Tr -complexity needs to be supplemented with the case in
which a derivation ends with an application of the innitary rule. This can be informally described
as follows. If a derivation풟 ends with
(5) … 훾푗푖11 ,… , 훾푗푖푛푛 ⇒ 훿푘푖11 ,… , 훿푘푖푚푚 휑(푡푖) …훾1,… , 훾푛 ⇒ 훿1,… , 훿푚,∀푥휑
then: 휏(훾푘) ∶= sup{휏(훾푗푖푘푘 ) | 푖 ∈ 휔, 1 ≤ 푘 ≤ 푛},휏(훿푙) ∶= sup{휏(훿푘푖푙푙 ) | 푖 ∈ 휔, 1 ≤ 푙 ≤ 푚},휏(∀푥휑) ∶= sup{휏(휑(푡)) | 푡 a closed term of ℒ+ℕ}.
Here’s the ocial denition of the innitary system LGT∞:
Definition 5 (LGT∞). LGT∞ is obtained from LGT by:∙ Omitting free variables.∙ Replacing the axioms (⊤), (⊥) with
(핋) 푚,훽훼 Γ ⇒ 푟 = 푠,∆ for any 훼, 훽,푚 and with 푟ℕ = 푠ℕ;(픽) 푚,훽훼 Γ, 푟 = 푠 ⇒ ∆ for any 훼, 훽,푚 and with 푟ℕ ≠ 푠ℕ.∙ Replacing Trl and Trr with the more general:
(Trrℕ) If LGTℕ 푚,훽훼 Γ ⇒ 휑,∆, then LGTℕ 푚,훿훾 Γ ⇒ Tr 푡,∆, with 훼 < 훾, 훽 < 훿, 푡 = #휑,휏(Tr 푡) = 휏(휑) + 1, and the Tr -complexities of the side formulas are unchanged.(Trlℕ) If LGTℕ 푚,훽훼 Γ, 휑 ⇒ ∆, then LGTℕ 푚,훿훾 Γ,Tr 푡 ⇒ ∆, with 훼 < 훾, 훽 < 훿, 푡 = #휑,휏(Tr 푡) = 휏(휑) + 1, and the Tr -complexities of the side formulas are unchanged.∙ Replacing (∀r) with:
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with 휏(∀푥휑) = sup{휏(휑(푡)) | 푡 a term of ℒ+ℕ}.
remark 3.
(i) The general formulation of Trr∗ and Trl∗ is essential for the claims below. It allows trans-
nite iterations of applications of Tr , which are otherwise not available, even in the presence
of the 휔-rule. This can be easily seen by considering the function representing the rightmost
operation in (4), which we call tr(푛, 푡).LGT∞ ⊢ Tr(tr(푛, ⌜0 = 0⌝)) for any 푛 ∈ 휔.
The 휔-rule then gives us transnite iterations of Tr . This process, of course, carries on for
further recursive ordinals by carefully choosing syntactic operations akin to tr(⋅).
(ii) As before, LPC∞ proves identity sequents Γ, 휑 ⇒ 휑,∆ for all 휑 ∈ ℒ+ℕ.
Then the cut-elimination strategy proceeds with only minor variations. We have:
Lemma 10.
(i) (Weakening) If LGT∞ 푚,훽훼 Γ ⇒ ∆, then LGT∞ 푚,훽훼 Γ0,Γ ⇒ ∆0,∆ with all formulas in ∆0,Γ0
with minimal Tr -complexity.
(ii) (Inversion) All rules shared by LGT∞ and LPC are length-, and 휏-invertible as prescribed by
Lemma 3, (i)-(iv). Moreover:
if LGT∞ 푚,훽훼 Γ ⇒ ∆,∀푥휑, then LGT∞ 푚,훽훼 Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑(푡푖), for any closed term푡푖 . In addition, 휏(휑(푡푖)) ≤ 휏(∀푥휑) and the Tr -complexity of the formulas
in the inverted sequent is the maximum of their occurrences in the original
sequent.
(iii) Contraction is 휏-preserving and length-preserving admissible in LGT∞.
In particular, the reduction lemma generalizes to ordinals in the expected way. It is obviously
important to employ ordinal addition in the induction to deal with cuts on principal formulas of휔-rules.
Proposition 2. If LPC∞ 푚,훽훼0 Γ ⇒ ∆, 휑 and LPC∞ 푚,훽훼0 휑,Γ ⇒ ∆, then LPC∞ 푚,훽훼0+훼1 Γ ⇒ ∆.
Therefore,
If LGT∞ 푚,훽훼 Γ ⇒ ∆, then LGT∞ 0,훽 Γ ⇒ ∆.
In light of Proposition 2, one can employ LPC∞ to establish the consistency, via appropriate em-
beddings, of nitary extensions of LGTℕ with induction axioms.
4.2. Fixed-pointmodels. We relate the innitary system introduced above and a xed-pointmodel
for ℒTr . The results of this section are intended to compare to [FG18] and, less directly, to [Can90].
We show that the form of invertibility allowed by LGT∞ enables one to preserve fully disquotational
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truth rules with context while capturing Kripkean grounded truth. In the references mentioned, this
could only be achieved by disallowing contexts altogether from the premisses of (Trl) and (Trr).
Consider the following formula of the language ℒ2ℕ of second-order arithmetic,K(푋, 푥) ∶↔ Sentℒ+Tr (푥) ∧∃푦∃푧(Ctℒ+Tr (푦) ∧ Ctℒ+Tr (푧) ∧ 푥 = (푦=. 푧) ∧ val(푦) = val(푧)) ∨∃푦∃푧(Ctℒ+Tr (푦) ∧ Ctℒ+Tr (푧) ∧ 푥 = ¬. (푦=. 푧) ∧ val(푦) ≠ val(푧)) ∨∃푦(CT(푦) ∧ 푥 = sub(⌜Tr푣⌝, ⌜푣⌝, 푦) ∧ val(푦) ∈ 푋) ∨∃푦(CT(푦) ∧ 푥 = sub(⌜¬Tr푣⌝, ⌜푣⌝, 푦) ∧ (¬. val(푦)) ∈ 푋) ∨∃푦(Sentℒ+Tr (푦) ∧ 푥 = (¬.¬. 푦) ∧ 푦 ∈ 푋) ∨∃푦∃푧(Sentℒ+Tr (푥) ∧ 푥 = (푦∧. 푥) ∧ 푦 ∈ 푋 ∧ 푧 ∈ 푋) ∨∃푦∃푧(Sentℒ+Tr (푥) ∧ 푥 = (¬. (푦∧. 푧)) ∧ (¬. 푦) ∈ 푋 ∨ (¬. 푧) ∈ 푋) ∨∃푣∃푦(Sentℒ+Tr (푥) ∧ 푥 = (∀. 푣푦) ∧ ∀푢(CT(푢)→ sub(푥, 푣, 푢) ∈ 푋)) ∨∃푣∃푦(Sentℒ+Tr (푥) ∧ 푥 = (¬. ∀. 푣푦) ∧ ∃푢(CT(푢) ∧ ¬. sub(푥, 푣, 푢) ∈ 푋)).
By inspection of K(푋, 푥), it is clear that 푋 occurs positively in it, in the sense that it does not contain
occurrences of 푢 ∉ 푋, and essentially so.9 We dene an operator 훷K ∶ ℙ(휔)→ ℙ(휔) as follows:훷K(푆) ∶= {푛 | (ℕ, 푆) ⊨ K(푋, 푛)},
where (ℕ, 푆) expresses that 푆 is used to interpret the variable 푋. Since K(푋, 푥) is 푋-positive, 훷K is
monotone:
(6) 푆0 ⊆ 푆1 only if 훷K(푆0) ⊆ 훷K(푆1).
By transnite recursion, one then sets:훷K훼 ∶= 훷K(훷K<훼), with 훷K<훼 ∶=⋃훽<훼훷K훽 .
It is clear that 훷K has xed points, i.e. there are ordinals 훾 such that 훷K<훾 = 훷K훾.10 We let 휅퐾 =min{훼 | 훷K<훼 = 훷K훼}, and I훷K ∶= 훷K<훼. I훷K is called the minimal xed point of 훷K. It is well-
known (see e.g. [Poh09, Ch. 6]), that 휅퐾 = 휔CK1 .I훷K is well-known for capturing the concept of grounded truth [Kri75], because any #휑 ∈ I훷K is
either a true atomic sentence of ℒ+ℕ or an atomic truth appears in its ‘dependency’ structure [Lei05].
We will briey return on the connection between LGT∞ and grounded truth shortly.
For 푛 ∈ I훷K , its inductive norm is dened as:|푛|훷K ∶= min{훼 | 푛 ∈ 훷K훼}.
9More precisely, this means that we can translate K(푋, 푥) in a Tait-language and no occurrences of 푢 ∉ 푋 are present.
10Otherwise, {푛 | 푛 ∈ 훷K훼 ⧵ 훷K<훼} would be a subset of ℕ of cardinality ℵ1.
Cut and Initial Sequents 17
We also have:
(7) 푛 ∈ I훷K i ∀푋(∀푥(K(푋, 푥)→ 푥 ∈ 푋)→ 푛 ∈ 푋),
so I훷K is Π11-denable in ℒ2ℕ. As noticed by [Kri75] (see also [Bur86]), I훷K is Π11-complete.11
The strict relationships between Π11-sets and innitary cut-free calculi are secured by general re-
sults [Poh09, §6.6]. To witness the link between LGT∞ and I훷K , we establish a direct correspondence
between the two frameworks. The existence of a nice semantics for LGT-based systems will then
immediately follow.
Lemma 11. If LGT∞ 0,훽훼 Γ ⇒ ∆, then either there is a 훾 ∈ Γ with |#¬훾|훷K ≤ 훼 or there is a 훿 ∈ ∆
with |#훿|훷K ≤ 훼.
Proof. The proof is by transnite induction on 훼 ≤ 휔CK1 .
If 훼 = 0, then the claim follows by denition for (핋) and (픽), or from the fact that closed atomic
identities of ℒ+Tr are decided by I훷.
If 훼 is successor or limit the claim follows by inductive hypothesis by reecting on the fact that the
disjuncts in K follow closely the rules of LPC∞. For instance, if Γ ⇒ ∆ is proved by an application of(Trrℕ), we have 0,훽0훼0 Γ ⇒ ∆0, 휑
with 훽 ≤ 훽, 훼0 ≤ 훼, 휏(휑) < 훽. If some 훾 ∈ Γ is such that |훾|훷K ≤ 훼0, or some 훿0 ∈ ∆0 is such that|훿0|훷K ≤ 훼0, we are done by the denition of 훷훼. Otherwise, by induction hypothesis, we have that|휑|훷K ≤ 훼0 and therefore, for 푡ℕ = #휑, |Tr 푡|훷K ≤ 훼. qed.
Lemma 11 reveals a non-standard way of thinking about ‘logical’ consequence – or better, sat-
isability of sequents – in Kripke models which is intrinsic to LGT and extensions thereof. If in
the customary approach – cf. for instance the literature stemming from [HH06] – the satisability
of a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is dened as preservation of truth in xed-point models, the notion of conse-
quence underlying the semantics of LGT is based on the existence of appropriate determinate truth
values (false in the antecedent, true in the succedent). In the terminology of [CERvR12], this is a
tolerant-strict notion of consequence. As mentioned earlier in the paper, [NR18] proposed such no-
tion of consequence and showed that this semantics is compatible with a primitive, self-applicable
predicate for consequence which fully internalizes it in the object-language. A more comprehensive
study of such notion, including the formulation of a compositional theory of a truth whose 휔-models
are exactly the xed points of 훷K above, is carried out in [NR20].
Conversely, we also have that the extension of I훷 can be characterized in terms of LGT∞ proofs.
Lemma 12. If |#휑|훷K ≤ 훼, then LGT∞ 0,훽훼+1 ⇒ 휑, with 훽 ≤ 훼 + 1.
Proof. The proof is again by induction on 훼.
11The idea of the proof: one can uniformly replace 푦 ∈ 푋 by Tr sub(푢, ⌜푣⌝,num(푦)) in 푃(푥, 푋) – an arbitrary inductive
denition – to obtain 푃′(푥, 푢). The diagonal lemma then yields a formula 휉(푣) such that(ℕ, 푋) ⊨ 휉(푣) i (ℕ, 푋) ⊨ 푃′(푥, ⌜휉(푣)⌝).
Finally, one shows that 푛 ∈ I푃 if and only if (ℕ, I훷K ) ⊨ Tr⌜휉(푛̇)⌝.
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If 훼 = 0, 휑 can only be 푠 = 푡 or 푠 ≠ 푡 for closed terms 푠, 푡 and 푠ℕ = 푡ℕ or 푠ℕ ≠ 푡ℕ respectively. In
the latter case, one has 0,00 Γ, 푠 = 푡 ⇒ ∆, and therefore 1 Γ ⇒ 푠 ≠ 푡,∆.
If 훼 > 0, the induction hypothesis in crucially employed. Themismatch between norm and length
of proof is again required when negated formulas are considered. For instance, if |#¬Tr 푡|훷K = 훼,
then |#¬휓|훷K = 훽 < 훼 with 푡ℕ = #휓. The induction hypothesis then yields 0,훾훽 ⇒ ¬휓. By the
inversion (Lemma 10), (Trlℕ), and (¬r), we then obtain the claim. qed.
Corollary 3. |#휑| ∈ I훷K if and only if LGT∞ 0,훽훼 ⇒ 휑 for some 훽 ≤ 훼 < 휔CK1 .
It is clear that, since we can straightforwardly embed LGTℕ – but, as mentioned in the previous
subsection also an extensions of LGTℕ with full ℒTr -induction – in LGT∞, the results above also
amount to soundness proofs, with respect to xed-point semantics, of our systemsmodulo the notion
of consequence relation specied by Lemma 11.
5. Conclusion
The focus of this paper is on the structural properties of theories of fully disquotational truth
with restricted initial sequents. If one nds the framework appealing for the basic logical properties
presented here, there are certainly further philosophical and technical questions to be investigated.
Reasoning theories such as LGT and extensions thereof displays a special relationships occurring
between truth ascriptions and the underlying base language, which is not available in alternative
formal systems to transparent truth. Philosophers often explain grounded truth is in terms of a form
of supervenience of truth on the non-truth-theoretic world (cf. for instance [Lei05]). Theories in the
style of LGT seem to capture this idea in a particularly strong way. Essentially, the absence of initial
sequents featuring the truth predicate blocks the possibility of reasoninghypotheticallywith arbitrary
truth ascriptions. Only formulas of the base language can be freely assumed in reasoning – cf. Lemma
1(iv), (3), Remark 3(ii). Semantically speaking, in the context fully structural approaches, one can
perform hypothetical reasoning also by employing sentences that may not have a determinate truth
value. This may be dealt with, for instance, as in [Kri75], by applying Strawson’s analysis that the hy-
pothesis of a truth ascription should be understood as an attempt tomake a claim, to express a propo-
sition. In the present framework this is ruled out, and hypothetical reasoning is only available for
sentences that are taken to always express propositions, such as sentences of the base language. This
does not amount to say that for no sentence containing the truth predicate some form of hypothetical
reasoning is available. The framework automatically enables one to iterate the truth predicate over
sentences that are ‘grounded’. For instance, the inference Tr (tr(푛, ⌜0 = 0⌝)) ⇒ Tr (tr(푛, ⌜0 = 0⌝))
is available for any 푛 in LGTℕ, and this can be iterated into the transnite in LGT∞. Moreover, this
is achieved without assigning any indices to truth predicates: hypothetical reasoning on truth is au-
tomatically grounded in non-truth-theoretic facts, even in the presence of a fully transparent truth
predicate. On the other hand, it’s also clear that blind hypothetical reasoning, given the unden-
ability of groudnedness, is only available for non-truth-theoretic sentences. It seems interesting to
explore further the connections betweenLGT, grounded truth, and the associated notion of groudned
inference stemming from [NR18].
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On the logical side, a natural development consists in considering extensions of LGTℕ with in-
duction principles and more complex truth rules such as general compositional rules. In particular,
since the presence of induction prevents full cut elimination arguments, the main focus would be on
variants of Proposition 1 (conservativity property) for such extensions. The main strategy needs to
be modied to resemble more closely the conservativity proof-strategy followed in [Hal99, Lei15] for
the compositional, Tarskian truth theory known as CT↾, in which one does not require the strong
invertibility properties proper of the 퐆ퟑ systems above. The restriction of initial sequents in that
context looks promising because the the counterexamples found to the general strategy in [Hal99] –
cf. [Lei15, §3.7] – involve an essential use of contraction and initial sequents involving truth ascrip-
tions.
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